Introduction
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, a number of policymakers have attributed unemployment's slow recovery to structural factors (cf. Kocherlakota 2010; Lacker 2012; and Plosser 2012) . Partial support for this view has emerged from a series of recent studies showing that structural factors account for a small but non-negligible share of unemployment dynamics (cf. Barnichon and Figura, 2015 , Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin, 2010 , and Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante, 2014 . In such a scenario, the conventional wisdom on the role of monetary policy is well summarized by the following quote from Plosser (2012) :
"You can't change the carpenter into a nurse easily, and you can't change the mortgage broker into a computer expert in a manufacturing plant very easily. Eventually that stu¤ will work itself out...Monetary policy can't retrain people. Monetary policy can't …x those problems." More recently, the steep decline in the US labor force participation rate has also been mentioned as an important structural factor driving labor market dynamics that should not be addressed by monetary policy (cf. Bullard, 2014) .
In this paper we reconsider the role of monetary policy in the context of a simple New Keynesian model with search frictions in which unemployment is driven by matching e¢ ciency shocks and by shocks to the size of the labor force. We focus on these two shocks as, we believe, they capture the bulk of unemployment ‡uctuations induced by structural factors or, put di¤erently, as these shocks are arguably the main drivers of the natural rate of unemployment. This view is supported by some recent empirical evidence.
On the one hand, matching e¢ ciency shocks are the dominant drivers of the natural rate of unemployment in the estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model by Furlanetto and Groshenny (2016b) . On the other hand, labor supply factors, though not considered in recent analysis of the natural rate of unemployment, turn out to be important drivers of unemployment in the long run in the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model estimated by Foroni, Furlanetto and Lepetit (2015) . While all shocks (and not only shocks originating in the labor market) are supposed to a¤ect the natural rate of unemployment and while other shocks (like shocks to unemployment bene…ts) may also be used to summarize the dynamics induced by structural factors, we believe that the two selected shocks are the best candidates to develop our argument.
In contrast with the conventional view, we …nd that monetary policy should react to variations in unemployment due to structural factors. However, the kind of response depends on the monetary policy framework. Both negative matching e¢ ciency shocks and negative shocks to the labor force call for an increase in the nominal interest rate when policy is conducted following a Taylor-type rule. In contrast, the optimal Ramsey monetary policy prescribes a reduction in the interest rate, thus tracking the natural rate of interest, which declines on impact of both shocks.
We proceed in three steps. First, we investigate the transmission mechanism of the shocks when the monetary policy authority reacts to the state of the economy following a Taylor-type rule responding to in ‡ation and output growth (in the presence of interest rate smoothing). A reduction in matching e¢ ciency increases hiring costs for …rms and creates in ‡ationary pressures, an increase in unemployment and a decrease in output.
An increase in in ‡ation calls for an increase in the interest rate when monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule, despite the recessionary e¤ects of the shocks on output. Thus, monetary policy responds to an increase in unemployment even though this increase is due to structural factors. Notably, the same e¤ects are at play in response to a negative shock to the labor force, although in this case unemployment decreases.
In a second step we compute the optimal Ramsey monetary policy that sets the interest rate in order to limit the ine¢ ciencies due to monopolistic competition, sticky prices and search frictions in the labor market. For a broad range of parameterizations, it is optimal to lower the nominal interest rate in response to both shocks. The reason is that the optimal policy calls only for mild deviations from price stability and thus tracks somewhat closely the natural rate of interest, i.e. the counterfactual level of the interest rate that emerges in the absence of nominal rigidities. Notably, the natural rate of interest declines in our model, since search frictions induce a hump-shaped response in employment that emerges independently from the degree of nominal rigidities and that requires an increase in the natural rate of interest to induce hump-shaped dynamics also in consumption.
Thus, while a Taylor-type rule moves the policy rate and the natural rate in opposite directions, the optimal policy moves them in the same direction.
Finally, in a third step we introduce a time-varying intercept (given by the natural rate of interest) in the Taylor-type rule. Such a rule approximates relatively well the dynamics obtained under optimal policy, thus con…rming the importance of the natural rate of interest in the formulation of the monetary policy strategy, as also highlighted by Barsky, Justiniano and Melosi (2014) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2015) .
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal monetary policy in the presence of labor market frictions. Cooley and Quadrini (2004) consider the optimal policy in response to productivity shocks in a model with search frictions and a cost channel. We use the methodology developed by Schmitt- Grohe and Uribe (2004) and applied by Faia (2009) to study technology and government spending shocks. While many papers have discussed the properties of matching e¢ ciency shocks (cf. Andolfatto, 1996; Groshenny, 2016a and 2016b; Justiniano and Michelacci, 2011) , the optimal policy response to these disturbances is discussed only in Mileva (2013) where, however, the connection with the natural rate of interest is not explored. 1 Furthermore, the optimal policy response to shocks to the labor force has not been studied in the literature.
We also contribute to the growing literature on the natural rate of interest. The usefulness of this concept for monetary policy purposes has been highlighted by Barsky, Justiniano and Melosi (2014) , Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2015) , Orphanides and Williams (2002) and Woodford (2001) . Curdia, Ferrero, Ng and Tambalotti (2015) …nd evidence that the Fed has responded to the natural rate of interest in its reaction function. Carvalho, Ferrero and Nechio (2016) discuss the link between demographic factors and real interest rates. In addition, several papers (cf. Hamilton, Harris, Hatzius and West, 2015; Laubach and Williams, 2015 , and the references therein) document a decline in the nat-1 Alternatively, Walsh (2011 and and Thomas (2008) use the linear quadratic approach based on a …rst order approximation of the competitive equilibrium conditions and on a second order approximation of the utility function. Those papers assume a non-distorted steady-state obtained by introducing appropriate subsidies and by imposing the Hosios (1990) condition at all states and times. Since we use the Ramsey approach, our steady state is distorted and we do not need to impose the Hosios condition. Furthermore, these papers consider demand, productivity and wage bargaining shocks but do not discuss shocks that have a large impact on the natural rate of unemployment (i.e. matching e¢ ciency and labor supply shocks). ural rate of interest in the aftermath of the Great Recession. While many factors may have played a role, our paper shows that shocks originating in the labor market may also have contributed to this recent decline.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 brie ‡y describes the model, Section 3 presents our results when monetary policy is conducted following a Taylor-type rule, Section 4 proposes the optimal monetary policy exercise and Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The model economy consists of a representative household, a continuum of intermediate good-producing …rms, a continuum of monopolistically competitive retail …rms, and monetary and …scal authorities that set monetary and …scal policy, respectively. The model is purposely simple and largely builds on Ravenna and Walsh (2008) , Faia (2009) , Furlanetto and Groshenny (2016a) and Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2010) .
The Representative Household The representative household is a large family, made up of a continuum of individuals of measure L t that represents the size of the labor force and evolves exogenously following an autoregressive process
where L denotes the steady-state value of the labor force (that is set equal to 1), while L measures the persistence of the shock, and " Lt is i:i:d:N (0; 2 L ). Family members are either working or searching for a job. Following Merz (1995) , we assume that family members pool their income and share the same level of consumption.
The representative family enters each period t = 0; 1; 2; :::; where R t denotes the gross nominal interest rate between period t and t + 1. The family's period t budget constraint is given by
where C t represents a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of retail goods purchased for consumption purposes and P t is the corresponding price index.
The family's lifetime utility is described by
where 0 < < 1.
Intermediate Good-Producing Firms Each intermediate good-producing …rm i 2 [0; 1] enters in period t with a stock of N t 1 (i) employees. Following Ravenna and Walsh (2008) , new matches become productive in the period. Before production starts, N t 1 (i) old jobs are destroyed. The job destruction rate is constant. The workers who have lost their jobs start searching immediately and can possibly still be hired in period t with a probability given by the job-…nding rate. Employment at …rm i evolves
The term V t (i) denotes vacancies posted by …rm i in period t and Q t is the aggregate probability of …lling a vacancy, de…ned as
di denote aggregate matches and vacancies respectively. Aggregate employment, N t = R 1 0 N t (i) di, evolves according to
The matching process is described by an aggregate constant-returns-to-scale Cobb Douglas matching function
where S t denotes the pool of job seekers in period t
and E t is a time-varying scale parameter that captures the e¢ ciency of the matching technology. It evolves exogenously following an autoregressive process
where E denotes the steady-state value of the matching e¢ ciency, while E measures the persistence of the shock, and " Et is i:i:d:N (0; 2 E ). Note that the pool of searchers is determined by exogenous ‡uctuations in the labor force, unemployed from the previous period and workers that separated before production starts. For simplicity, employed workers do not search in our model (for an extension with on-the-job search, cf. Krause and Lubik, 2006) .
The job-…nding rate (F t ) is de…ned as F t = Mt St and aggregate unemployment is U t L t N t : Since newly hired workers are immediately productive, the …rm can adjust its output instantaneously through variations in the workforce. However, …rms face hiring costs measured in terms of the …nished good (H t (i)) that represent the cost of posting vacancies and follow a standard linear speci…cation
The parameter N governs the magnitude of the hiring cost.
Each period, …rm i uses N t (i) employees to produce Y t (i) units of intermediate good i according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology described by
Each intermediate good-producing …rm i 2 [0; 1] chooses employment and vacancies to maximize pro…ts and sells its output Y t (i) in a perfectly competitive market at a price Z t (i) that represents the relative price of the intermediate good in terms of the …nal good.
The …rm maximizes
where t represents the marginal utility of consumption. Since the …rm is owned by the representative household, pro…ts are discounted using the household's discount factor.
Wage Setting The nominal wage W t (i) is determined through bilateral Nash bar-
where 0 < < 1 represents the worker's bargaining power. The worker's surplus, expressed in terms of …nal consumption goods, is given by
The …rm's surplus in real terms is given by
Retail Firms There is a continuum of retail goods-producing …rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1] that transform the intermediate good into a …nal good Y f t (j) that is sold in a monopolistically competitive market at price P t (j). Cost minimization implies that the real marginal cost is equal to the real price of the intermediate good (Z t ) that is common across …rms. Demand for good j is given by
represents the elasticity of substitution across …nal goods. Firms choose their price subject to a scheme in which every period a fraction is not allowed to re-optimize, whereas the remaining fraction 1 optimally chooses its price (P t (j)) by maximizing the discounted
All …rms resetting prices in any given period choose the same price. The aggregate price dynamics are then given by
Monetary and Fiscal Authorities The central bank adjusts the short-term nominal gross interest rate R t by following a Taylor-type rule
The degree of interest-rate smoothing r and the reaction coe¢ cients to in ‡ation and output growth ( and y ) are all positive.
The government budget constraint takes the form
Aggregate Resource Constraint The aggregate resource constraint reads
where
Notice that market clearing for each retail good implies that
A drives a wedge between …nal output and consumption.
Parameterization Our parameterization is based on the US economy and is summarized in Table 1 . 2 A …rst set of parameters is taken from the literature on monetary business cycle models. The discount factor is set at = 0:99; the elasticity of substitution across …nal goods at = 11, thus implying a steady-state markup of 10 percent. The parameters in the monetary policy rule are r = 0:8; = 1:5, y = 0:5. The average degree of price duration is four quarters, corresponding to = 0:75.
A second set of parameter values is taken from the literature on search and matching in the labor market. The degree of exogenous separation is set at = 0:085, while the steady-state value of the unemployment rate is U = 0:06. The elasticity on unemployment in the matching function is = 0:6, in the middle of the interval suggested by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) . In the absence of convincing empirical evidence on the value for the bargaining power parameter , we set it equal to 0.6 to satisfy the Hosios condition but we will consider a broad range of values in the optimal policy exercise. The vacancy …lling rate Q is set equal to 0:70. We follow Blanchard and Galí (2008) and we set N such that steady-state hiring costs are equal to one percent of steady-state output. The value of unemployment bene…ts is derived from the steady-state conditions. These choices are common in the literature and avoid the indeterminacy issues that are widespread in this kind of model, as shown by Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2010) among others. Finally, the degree of persistence for the matching e¢ ciency process is set at 0:90, in keeping with the estimate in Furlanetto and Groshenny (2016b) . We adopt the same value for the persistence of the shock to the labor force.
The log-linear …rst-order conditions are listed in 3 Results under a Taylor-type rule
In this section we describe the macroeconomic e¤ects of the two labor market shocks when the monetary policy authority follows a Taylor-type rule as in (16).
Matching e¢ ciency shocks To set the scene for the policy analysis, we plot in Figure 1 impulse responses to a negative matching e¢ ciency shock in a version of our baseline model with ‡exible prices (dashed lines). When matching e¢ ciency declines, the probability of …lling a vacancy drops and hiring becomes more expensive since more vacancies have to be posted to hire a worker. In response to the increase in hiring costs, …rms hire fewer workers and, given the assumption of instantaneous hiring, employment and output decline on impact of the shock while unemployment increases. Finally, higher hiring costs lead to an increase in prices in order to maintain a constant real marginal cost, as is optimal under ‡exible prices. The solid lines in Figure 1 refer to the same model in the presence of sticky prices. In this case …rms cannot increase prices optimally to restore pro…ts impaired by the increase in costs. Prices increase less than in the ‡exible price case, the fall in aggregate demand is less pronounced and the contraction in hiring is more limited.
Thus far we have highlighted the transmission mechanism of a matching e¢ ciency shock, as discussed in Groshenny (2016a and 2016b) . We now turn to the analysis of monetary policy, which constitutes the distinctive contribution of this paper.
In our baseline model with sticky prices and a Taylor-type rule, higher in ‡ation calls for an increase in the interest rate, whereas a decline in output calls for a reduction in the interest rate. Given the high coe¢ cient in response to in ‡ation in (16), the central bank chooses to tighten policy. 3 This result is somewhat counterintuitive because it prescribes to tighten policy in response to an increase in unemployment. Nevertheless, it follows naturally from the speci…cation of the Taylor-type rule and shows that policy is not inactive as advocated by the conventional view described in the Introduction.
Before investigating whether such an outcome is desirable, we discuss the response of the natural rate of interest, de…ned as the counterfactual level of the interest rate emerging in a version of our baseline model with ‡exible prices. In Figure 1 we show that the response of the natural rate of interest to a negative matching e¢ ciency shock is negative, thus highlighting a negative co-movement between the nominal interest rate (determined by the policy rule) and the natural rate of interest.
Why does the natural rate of interest decline? This is due to the hump-shaped dynamics generated by the shock. A negative matching e¢ ciency shock reduces production, employment and consumption on impact and even further for a few quarters. The natural rate of interest declines on impact (and increases slightly after a few periods) to induce an hump-shaped pro…le in the consumption response, thus equalizing demand and supply in the goods market. Why then do the employment, output and consumption responses feature this hump-shaped pro…le? On impact of the shock, the increase in hiring costs leads to a marked decline in the creation of new matches that translates immediately into a decline in employment (given the assumption of instantaneous hiring), as shown by the solid lines in Figure 2 . Notice that the maximum e¤ect on hiring is always on impact, as is the case for the response of investment to a technology shock (cf. McCallum, 1989, among others) . 4 The monotonic response in new hires, however, does not translate into a monotonic response in employment. Employment after one period will be lower than on impact as long as the number of new hires is lower than the number of separations in the previous period. This point can be seen by using (4) as follows:
This condition is satis…ed in our model since the decline in hiring is still sizeable for a few periods after the shock. The number of new hires is then back to its steady-state level and higher than the number of separations until employment reverts to its steady-state level.
Since hiring costs account only for a minor share of production in our simple economy, the hump-shaped response in employment translates into a hump-shaped response in consumption, and this leads to a decline in the natural rate of interest on impact.
Condition (19) highlights two parameters that are key to generating hump-shaped dynamics: the separation rate (appearing on the right-hand side) and the persistence of the shock (which largely governs the persistence of the response in new hires). Just for the sake of argument, let us consider the case with complete separation ( = 1), represented by dashed lines in Figure 2 . In this extreme but instructive case, the monotonic response of new hires is inherited by employment (the two variables now coincide) and the natural rate of interest increases on impact and converges monotonically to zero. This simple experiment shows how the long-term relationships between workers and …rms generated by search frictions are key to generating hump-shaped dynamics. Furthermore, the assumption about the shock's persistence is not innocuous. In fact, the negative comovement between the policy rate and the natural rate materializes only when the shock is su¢ ciently persistent, as shown in Figure 3 . When we lower the persistence to 0.5 (cf.
dashed lines), the natural rate of interest exhibits a zero impact response, whereas the actual and the natural rate positively comove when the shock is iid (cf. solid lines). The intuition for this result is very simple: when the shock is short-lived, the decline in hiring is also short-lived so that the natural rate increases to induce a declining consumption and employment path. 5 However, while it is important to recognize that persistence matters, our baseline parameterization with high persistence …nds strong empirical support in the estimated models by Furlanetto and Groshenny (2016b), Justiniano and Michelacci (2011) and Sala, Södeström and Trigari (2013) .
Shocks to the labor force In Figure 4 we plot impulse responses to a negative shock to the labor force. As in the previous case, this is also a shock with a direct e¤ect on the matching function: it reduces the number of searchers in the labor market and thus makes it more di¢ cult to create a match. This leads to a decline in hiring and to contractionary e¤ects on employment and output. There is one important di¤erence, however. In response to a decline in the labor force, unemployment falls as the decline in new hires is not su¢ cient to o¤set the decline in the labor force. Notably, this is also an in ‡ationary shock and the interest rate determined by the policy rule and the natural rate of interest negatively comove, as in the case of matching e¢ ciency shocks. Being a shock that directly a¤ects the matching function, all our previous considerations on the hump-shaped dynamics in employment, consumption and output are con…rmed in this context. We remark that, in contrast with the dynamics generated by matching e¢ ciency shocks, a negative shock to the labor force moves the output gap and the unemployment gap in opposite directions. Moreover, the shock lowers at the same time the natural rate of interest and the natural rate of unemployment. Carvalho, Ferrero and Nechio (2016) also emphasize that negative labor supply shocks (with a demographic interpretation) lead to a decline in the natural rate of interest in a model with overlapping generations. Our distinctive contribution is to highlight how a standard Taylor-type rule drives the actual and the natural rate of interest in opposite directions. In addition, we stress again the importance of search frictions in generating hump-shaped dynamics and a decline in the natural rate of interest. In a standard New Keynesian model with perfectly competitive labor markets, the natural rate would increase in response to a negative labor supply shock to the hours margin to generate a monotonic decline in consumption. Put di¤erently, the negative impact of adverse labor supply factors on the natural rate of interest relies on the presence of search frictions.
While the role of search friction is crucial is driving the negative response of the natural rate of interest in response to labor market shocks, the same result does not apply to technology shocks that we brie ‡y discuss here for the sake of completeness. We see in Figure 5 that a positive co-movement between the policy rate and the natural rate emerges when we simulate the e¤ects of a negative technology shock in our model, independently of the degree of the shock's persistence (which is set in Figure 5 at 0.9, 0.5 or 0, as was the case in Figure 3) . In fact, a technology shock drives a wedge between the hump-shaped employment dynamics generated by search frictions and the consumption dynamics, that are determined also by the monotonic process for technology. In such a case the natural rate of interest does not need to decline on impact, as was the case for the response to the two labor market shocks. 6 Search frictions have an impact on the transmission mechanism of technology shocks but these e¤ects are not su¢ cient to induce a negative co-movement beteween the policy and the natural rate, that is instead easily obtained in response to shocks that have a direct e¤ect on the matching function.
Optimal monetary policy
In the previous section we showed that the interest rate determined by the policy rule and the natural rate of interest move in opposite directions in response to a decline in matching e¢ ciency and to a decline in the labor force. In this section we investigate the optimal monetary policy problem and we relate our results to the policy debate that has emerged in the US in recent years.
We compute the Ramsey plan following the approach proposed by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004) where the optimal equilibrium is obtained from the maximization of agents' welfare subject to the competitive equilibrium relations.
Our model features three frictions: monopolistic competition, price stickiness and search frictions in the labor market. As discussed in Faia (2009) , monopolistic competition and the congestion externality implied by search frictions in the labor market call for deviations from price stability, whereas the distortion due to sticky prices is minimized when in ‡ation is maintained at zero. The optimal monetary policy solves the trade-o¤s between di¤erent objectives and sets the only instrument available, i.e. the nominal interest rate, to minimize distortions.
In Figure 6 we plot impulse responses under optimal policy for our baseline model in which the Hosios condition undoes the e¤ect of the search frictions (cf. dashed lines).
In this case we notice mild deviations from price stability due to the presence of monopolistic competition (cf. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004). 7 More generally, the optimal 6 Negative temporary technology shocks increase the natural rate of interest both in our model with search frictions and in the standard New Keynesian model with competitive labor markets. In contrast, negative shocks to the growth rate of technology reduce the natural rate of interest, as shown by Sims, (2012) and Christiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2010) among others. For a complete analysis of the e¤ects of technology shocks in a model with ‡exible price and search frictions, cf. Mandelman and Zanetti (2014) . 7 When we increase the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent varieties to high values, the optimality equilibrium tracks the ‡exible price allocation quite closely, although the allocation with fully constant mark-ups is not implementable (cf. Faia, 2009) .
A key point of the paper is that the optimal interest rate decreases in response to a negative matching e¢ ciency shock, thus tracking the behavior of the natural rate of interest. This result per se is not surprising as it is well known from previous research that price stability is nearly optimal, even in models where search frictions are pervasive (cf. Faia, 2009 , Mileva, 2013 , and Walsh, 2014 . What is surprising, however, is that the optimal policy prescription is in contrast with the behavior of the interest rate determined by the Taylor-type rule, as described in the previous section.
In Figure 6 we plot impulse responses also for alternative values of the bargaining power of workers, which is increased to 0.8 (cf. dotted lines) or decreased to 0.2 (cf. solid lines). In both cases the dynamics are very similar to our baseline case, thus showing the limited importance of search frictions'intensity for optimal monetary policy purposes. In Figure 7 we replicate the same exercise in response to a negative shock to the labor force.
Once again, the optimal policy closely tracks the natural rate of interest, in contrast with the outcome determined by a Taylor-type rule, and is relatively insensitive to deviations from the Hosios conditions.
Finally, we now investigate whether alternative Taylor-type rules may deliver a policy rate response with the correct sign.
In a …rst case we consider a rule with no interest rate smoothing, thus setting r equal to zero in (16) . We see in the …rst two panels of Figure 8 (cf. solid lines) that under such a rule the policy rate now declines on impact of the two shocks, thus comoving with the natural rate of interest. In fact the inertia generated by interest rate smoothing moves the economy away from the strict in ‡ation targeting outcome, which is a relatively good approximation of optimal monetary policy in our model. A closer comovement between the policy rate and the natural rate of interest can be obtained by increasing the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation. Dotted lines in the …rst two panels of Figure 8 refer to a policy rule with r = 0 and = 5.
In a second case we introduce the natural rate of interest in (16) with a unitary of full price stability is recovered. coe¢ cient, while keeping the degree of interest rate smoothing as in the baseline. We see in the last two panels of Figure 8 that also such a policy rule delivers a positive comovement between the policy rate and the natural rate in response to both shocks. This result extends the …ndings of Barsky, Justiniano and Melosi (2014) and Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2015) to a model with search frictions in the labor market driven by shocks originating in the labor market. Note, however, that we ignore here all the issues related to the unobservability of the natural rate of interest that may complicate the practical implementation of this kind of rule.
From our analysis, we conclude that it is optimal to lower the interest rate in response to a negative matching e¢ ciency shock and to a negative shock to the labor force as long as the shocks are su¢ ciently persistent. This is in contrast with the outcome determined by a Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing that prescribes an increase in the interest rate. While simple rules have been criticized elsewhere in the literature (cf. Svensson, 2003 , among others), we could …nd only one other case in which a Taylor-type rule delivers a response with the wrong sign for the policy rate. Christiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2010) …nd this result for the case of a news shock to technology that has a particularly large e¤ect on the natural rate of interest as it enters in its equation with a unitary coe¢ cient.
The monetary policy response to shocks to the natural rate of unemployment is a recurring theme in the policy debate. Speeches by Kocherlakota (2010) , Bullard (2012) , Lacker (2012), and Plosser (2011) allude to the possibility that structural factors in the labor market may explain a substantial share of unemployment dynamics. The policy prescription emerging from all these speeches is that monetary policy is not the right instrument to respond to shocks driving the natural rate of unemployment. In contrast, according to our model, monetary policy has a role to play because its intermediate targets (in ‡ation and real variables such as output and unemployment) are a¤ected by shocks originating in the labor market. Furthermore, as long as the shocks are persistent, the optimal policy is to lower the interest rate, as in response to negative demand shocks. We conclude that, from a purely qualitative point of view, it does not matter much whether unemployment is driven by structural factors or by aggregate demand shocks.
Finally, it is interesting to relate our …ndings to a large recent literature that has discussed a possible decline in the natural rate of interest (cf. Hamilton, Harris, Hatzius and West, 2015; Laubach and Williams, 2015 , and the references therein). Several reasons have been advocated to explain this decline, including changes in trend growth, variations in discount rates, …nancial regulation, trends in in ‡ation, bubbles and cyclical headwinds.
Our paper highlights two additional reasons (possibly among many others) that may explain a decline in the natural rate of interest in recent years: a persistent decline in matching e¢ ciency and negative shocks to the labor force.
Conclusion
It is well known that price stability is nearly optimal, even in models with a pervasive role for search frictions (cf. Walsh, 2014, for a broad review of this result). What is less known are the implications of such a policy when unemployment is driven by structural factors.
Our contribution is to show that tracking the natural rate of interest is particularly useful in such a context. While the optimal policy is to lower the policy rate ( 
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